coreml
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external and potentially untrusted data through machine learning models, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection or adversarial attacks.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests images via
createPixelBufferand text viaanalyzeSentimentinSKILL.mdandreferences/coreml-swift-integration.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. Data inputs are passed directly to the
MLModel.predictionAPI without delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded content.\n - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
MLModel.predictionfor inference andFileManager.default.moveItemfor persistent model storage inreferences/coreml-swift-integration.md.\n - Sanitization: Absent. The provided snippets do not include logic to sanitize or validate inputs against malicious patterns or adversarial examples.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides implementation patterns for on-device compilation of model source files into executable binaries.\n
- The
ModelManagerimplementation inreferences/coreml-swift-integration.mdusesMLModel.compileModel(at:)to transform.mlpackageor.mlmodelfiles into the.mlmodelcformat at runtime.\n - The instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly note this is intended for models "downloaded from a server," which involves executing assets generated from remote sources on the local device.\n- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill contains deceptive documentation references in the metadata and references section.\n - The
Referencessection inSKILL.mdcontains multiple links using thesosumi.aidomain instead of the officialdeveloper.apple.comdomain. While this is a known community redirector, it imitates official Apple documentation paths and directs users to unofficial sources for platform information.
Audit Metadata