contacts-framework
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent on how to ingest data from the device's contacts database, establishing a surface for indirect prompt injection if contact fields contain malicious payloads.
- Ingestion points: Contact data is enumerated and fetched using
CNContactFetchRequestandenumerateContactswithinSKILL.mdandreferences/contacts-patterns.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide instructions for using delimiters or boundary warnings to protect the agent from instructions embedded in contact data fields (e.g., names or notes).
- Capability inventory: The skill enables high-privilege operations such as modifying contact records (
CNSaveRequest), exporting data to vCards (CNContactVCardSerialization), and managing contact groups. - Sanitization: No input validation or escaping protocols are provided for the data retrieved from external contact records.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references include links to an unofficial third-party domain instead of official Apple developer resources.
- Evidence: Multiple references in
SKILL.mdpoint tososumi.aifor framework documentation and API specifications.
Audit Metadata