skills/thienqo/ios-skills/coreml/Gen Agent Trust Hub

coreml

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONINGDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to an unofficial documentation domain ('sosumi.ai') for all framework references. These links (e.g., 'https://sosumi.ai/documentation/coreml') mimic the directory structure of official Apple documentation, which is deceptive and could lead to the ingestion of untrusted or malicious technical guidance.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly promotes a workflow where the application downloads model packages from remote URLs and compiles them at runtime using 'MLModel.compileModel(at: url)'. This pattern facilitates the execution of remote logic (ML models) without specifying necessary integrity checks or source verification, presenting a significant attack surface.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill references future-dated software versions (e.g., 'iOS 26+' and 'Swift 6.3') and utilizes a domain name ('sosumi.ai') that is a known parody of Apple's historical legal labels. This combination of hallucinated technical requirements and deceptive documentation links misleads users about the skill's authority and safety.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The implementation guidance in 'references/coreml-swift-integration.md' demonstrates runtime generation of executable model artifacts ('.mlmodelc') from dynamic sources. The subsequent loading of these generated binaries into the process memory represents a dynamic execution risk if the input '.mlpackage' is sourced from an unverified location.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as a pipeline for processing externally supplied data structures (Core ML models and tensors).
  • Ingestion points: Models are loaded via 'MLModel.load(contentsOf:)' from URLs or file paths.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or validation logic is provided to distinguish between trusted and untrusted model assets.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to perform file system operations (creating directories, moving items) and runtime binary compilation.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or signature verification for external model files before they are compiled and executed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 12:02 PM