ae-team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core function of ingesting and acting upon data from external agent runs and artifact contents.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through output from commands such as
ae-cli team +run-result,ae-cli team +run-artifacts, andae-cli team +run-watch(referenced in SKILL.md, references/run-result.md, references/run-artifacts.md, and references/run-watch.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define strict delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers when interpolating external run outputs into subsequent prompts, instead directing the agent to process data verbatim.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities to execute shell commands via the
ae-clitool, including starting new runs, updating team configurations, and deleting resources (SKILL.md, references/create.md, references/delete.md). - Sanitization: There are no explicit sanitization or validation steps described for data retrieved from the engine before it is used in multi-turn logic or presented to the user.
Audit Metadata