ae-use-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches agent instructions from a remote host via
ae-cli agent +get-agent-contextand incorporates them into the local task guidance. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious external instructions could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Instructions are retrieved from a user-supplied host using
ae-clicommand output (found in SKILL.md and references/local-agent.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions are integrated into the task guidance hierarchy; however, no specific delimiters or boundary warnings are mandated for the remote content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
ae-clifor shell execution, file writing (via--output), and accessing sensitive user credentials. - Sanitization: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to inspect scripts before any execution and to ensure that sensitive credential output remains out of the chat conversation and logs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on multiple
ae-clishell commands to manage agent discovery, authentication status, and retrieval of remote content (references, scripts, and assets). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation guides the installation of the
ae-clitool from both the public NPM registry and a private vendor registry athttps://npm.thinkingdata.cn:3443. These resources originate from the skill's infrastructure and are intended for its primary function. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a flow for exporting MCP credentials using the
--include-mcp-credentialsflag. Although the skill includes instructions to handle this data safely, the presence of functionality to retrieve and process sensitive connection secrets constitutes a high-value data access capability.
Audit Metadata