funnel-misconceptions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
ae-clitool to perform all data operations. It utilizes shell-native features like HEREDOCs (cat > /tmp/... <<'EOF') to generate temporary JSON configuration files and command substitution ($(cat ...)) to pass these definitions to the tool. This is a standard pattern for the agent's intended data analysis purpose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect injection as it ingests external data (user IDs and report configurations) and interpolates them into command definitions.
- Ingestion points: User-provided
user_id(SKILL.md Step 2) and funnel report data retrieved viaae-cli analysis report get(SKILL.md Step 1). - Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON structures to wrap data but lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious control tokens within the ingested user IDs or report properties.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive shell access to the
ae-clitool, including commands for adhoc queries, drilldown operations, and event detail exports. - Sanitization: There are no specific instructions to sanitize or validate the format of the
user_idbefore it is placed into the JSON definition template.
Audit Metadata