jt-ask-brief

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an interview process where user-provided requirements are written directly into a file (card-loop/brief.md). This establishes an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the brief and later parsed or executed by other agents or tools.
  • Ingestion points: User input provided during the requirement-gathering interview (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use boundary markers or delimiters to isolate user-provided content within the generated brief.md file.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file writing capabilities to create card-loop/brief.md and instructs the agent to perform Git operations (checkout, commit).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, sanitization, or escaping of the user's responses before they are written to the filesystem and committed to the repository.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to perform repository management tasks that depend on data sourced from the environment.
  • Evidence: The "สร้าง" section directs the agent to checkout a branch based on a specific line ("สาขาคิว:") found in the local context (likely card-loop/board.md). If the source file containing this branch name is modified by an attacker, it could lead to the agent executing unintended Git commands or switching to unauthorized branches.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 02:45 AM