jt-ask-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an interview process where user-provided requirements are written directly into a file (
card-loop/brief.md). This establishes an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the brief and later parsed or executed by other agents or tools. - Ingestion points: User input provided during the requirement-gathering interview (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use boundary markers or delimiters to isolate user-provided content within the generated
brief.mdfile. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file writing capabilities to create
card-loop/brief.mdand instructs the agent to perform Git operations (checkout,commit). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, sanitization, or escaping of the user's responses before they are written to the filesystem and committed to the repository.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to perform repository management tasks that depend on data sourced from the environment.
- Evidence: The "สร้าง" section directs the agent to checkout a branch based on a specific line ("สาขาคิว:") found in the local context (likely
card-loop/board.md). If the source file containing this branch name is modified by an attacker, it could lead to the agent executing unintended Git commands or switching to unauthorized branches.
Audit Metadata