jt-do-work
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes an external validation script located in a sibling skill directory.
- Evidence: The instructions in
SKILL.mdcall for runningpython3 <BOLD>à¸à¸à¸¥à¹à¸à¸´à¸£à¹ skill jt-next-step</BOLD>/gate.py reach-review --root .. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes dynamic shell commands defined as placeholders within project data files.
- Evidence: The skill processes and executes strings stored in variables like
<TEST_CMD>,<SETUP_CMD>,<LINT_CMD>,<TYPECHECK_CMD>, and<BROWSER_TOOL>which are retrieved from theboard.mdor card files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted content in task board files.
- Ingestion points:
card-loop/board.mdand task card files located undercard-loop/backlog/inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific safety warnings are used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within these data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary shell commands, perform git operations (checkout, merge, push), and modify files within the repository (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization for the command strings (e.g.,
<TEST_CMD>) before they are passed to the shell for execution.
Audit Metadata