work-map
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub Issue bodies and comments, as well as local Markdown files. Maliciously crafted content in these sources could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the decision-map workflow.
- Ingestion points: Reading GitHub issue content via the
ghCLI and local files indocs/decision-map/as documented inSKILL.mdand implemented inscripts/github_map_ops.pyandscripts/local_map_ops.py. - Boundary markers: The skill uses specific HTML comment markers (e.g.,
<!-- decision-map:fog:start -->) to delimit tool-managed regions within documents, as defined inscripts/map_core.py. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
subprocess.run(primarily calling theghCLI) and perform file system writes to local Markdown files, as seen inscripts/github_map_ops.pyandscripts/local_map_ops.py. - Sanitization: The skill implements a
scrubfunction inscripts/map_core.pythat escapes tool-specific marker prefixes (e.g., converting<!-- decision-map:to<!-- decision-map:) in user-supplied strings before they are written to disk or the tracker. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python scripts utilize
subprocess.runto interact with the GitHub CLI (gh). - Evidence: The
GhApiclass inscripts/github_map_ops.pyexecutes commands like["gh", "api", ...]usingsubprocess.run. - Context: Command arguments such as repository names and ticket numbers are validated against a strict regex (
SAFE_SLUG_RE) inscripts/map_core.pyto prevent shell injection and path traversal. Data payloads are passed via JSON-encoded stdin to theghbinary, which is a robust way to handle potentially complex strings.
Audit Metadata