fix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from multiple sources. \n
- Ingestion points: User input via the
$ARGUMENTSplaceholder, architecture documentation (data-model.md), and cross-project memory (failure_patterns.json). \n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
npm test), modify project files, and invoke other agent skills (executeCommand). \n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of robust sanitization or validation of external inputs before they are used to influence the agent's hypothesis generation or fix implementation. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection to execute the system
datecommand (!date) at load time. This is a benign use case intended to provide a timestamp for the diagnostic process. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill programmatically invokes development-related shell commands such asnpm testandnpm run build, as well as internal skill commands likeexecuteCommand('data-model'), as part of its core diagnostic and repair workflow.
Audit Metadata