risk-score
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to interpolate the$ARGUMENTSvariable directly into shell commands such asgh pr diff <number or url>andgit ... diff <base>...HEAD. This is a classic command injection vector where a malicious user can execute arbitrary shell commands by including metacharacters (e.g.,123; malicious_command) in the input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's scoring logic in
scripts/score.pyand the rules defined inSKILL.mdspecifically target sensitive file paths and keywords. TheSENSITIVEandINFRApatterns explicitly include keywords such aspassword,secret,credential, and.env. Accessing the diffs of these files during the risk-scoring process exposes potentially sensitive information to the agent's context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted pull request diff data, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via the output of
gh pr diffandgit diffcommands (File:SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any boundary markers or special delimiters to isolate the external diff content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell command execution and file reading (File:
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no mechanism to sanitize or validate the external diff content, allowing instructions embedded in a PR to potentially influence the agent's behavior.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata