logmind

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and encourages the use of curl -fsSL https://logmind.dev/install.sh | bash for installation. Piping remote scripts directly to a shell is a high-risk pattern that allows for immediate execution of unverified code on the host system.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and installation scripts from logmind.dev and github.com/thrillmade/. While these appear associated with the stated author, the pattern of 'curl-to-bash' execution from a non-major public repository (like a well-known vendor) is a significant security concern.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily utilizes shell commands (logmind log, logmind init, logmind doctor) that automate sensitive Git operations, including git push. One specific command, logmind skill push, is noted to open a real pull request immediately without a confirmation prompt, which could lead to accidental data exposure or unintended code publication.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill mentions installing git hooks and merge drivers (logmind init). While standard for development tools, automated modification of local git configurations and hooks can be used to establish persistence or intercept developer actions (as seen in the blocking of git commit).
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://logmind.dev/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 24, 2026, 01:26 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — logmind