stage-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in external data and processed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
ask_usertool during the planning phase, through persona descriptions in theset_rosterstep, and via thematerialFactsandbrieffields in thegenerate_scenecall. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters or XML tags to wrap untrusted content, which could allow instructions hidden in 'materialFacts' to override the agent's intended behavior during page generation.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including persistent data creation via
create_stageandgenerate_scene, and audio synthesis viagenerate_tts. - Sanitization: There are no explicit requirements for the agent to sanitize, validate, or filter the content provided in personas or attached materials before incorporating them into the final classroom stage.
Audit Metadata