kimi-docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a workflow where the agent writes C# code to
Program.csat runtime, which is then compiled and executed using the .NET SDK via the./scripts/docx buildcommand. This dynamic code generation and execution path can be risky if untrusted input influences the generated code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes and executes a pre-compiled ELF binary located at
validator/Validator. This binary is used to validate OpenXML structures. Shipping and running opaque binaries is a security concern as their internal logic is difficult to audit. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and parses user-uploaded
.docxfiles by unzipping them and reading the internal XML content. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions inside a document could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the editing or code-generation process. - Ingestion points:
scripts/docx_lib/editing/context.py(unzips and parses user-provided docx files). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use specific delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the document XML.
- Capability inventory: Compilation and execution of generated C# code via
dotnet, execution of thevalidator/Validatorbinary, and extensive file system write operations. - Sanitization: The skill uses
xml_escapewhen interpolating text into XML structures inscripts/docx_lib/editing/revisions.py, providing protection against XML injection but not necessarily against natural language prompt injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's initialization script (
scripts/docx) downloads the .NET SDK installation script from Microsoft's officialdot.netdomain. This is an expected operation for environment setup and targets a well-known, trusted service provider.
Audit Metadata