sustainability-rss-fetch

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external RSS feeds and presents summaries and titles to the agent for semantic screening based on a topic prompt. This creates a vulnerability where malicious instructions embedded in a journal's RSS title or summary could attempt to influence the agent's relevance marking or bypass filtering logic.
  • Ingestion points: RSS entries fetched from various publisher domains (e.g., nature.com, science.org) and stored in /tmp/sustainability-candidates.json via the collect-window command.
  • Boundary markers: The workflow does not specify the use of clear delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands when the agent evaluates the fetched candidates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses network access for fetching feeds, local file writing for JSON candidates, and SQLite database modification capabilities.
  • Sanitization: The script uses standard parsing libraries but does not specifically filter for prompt injection patterns within the ingested feed metadata.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches RSS feed content from several well-known academic publishing services and repositories.
  • Sources: Includes domains such as nature.com, science.org, sciencedirect.com, wiley.com, frontiersin.org, and tandfonline.com as defined in the assets/journal.opml file.
  • Dependencies: The instructions require installing the feedparser library from the official Python Package Index (PyPI), which is a standard industry practice for RSS processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 08:54 AM