sustainability-rss-fetch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external RSS feeds and presents summaries and titles to the agent for semantic screening based on a topic prompt. This creates a vulnerability where malicious instructions embedded in a journal's RSS title or summary could attempt to influence the agent's relevance marking or bypass filtering logic.
- Ingestion points: RSS entries fetched from various publisher domains (e.g., nature.com, science.org) and stored in
/tmp/sustainability-candidates.jsonvia thecollect-windowcommand. - Boundary markers: The workflow does not specify the use of clear delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands when the agent evaluates the fetched candidates.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network access for fetching feeds, local file writing for JSON candidates, and SQLite database modification capabilities.
- Sanitization: The script uses standard parsing libraries but does not specifically filter for prompt injection patterns within the ingested feed metadata.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches RSS feed content from several well-known academic publishing services and repositories.
- Sources: Includes domains such as
nature.com,science.org,sciencedirect.com,wiley.com,frontiersin.org, andtandfonline.comas defined in theassets/journal.opmlfile. - Dependencies: The instructions require installing the
feedparserlibrary from the official Python Package Index (PyPI), which is a standard industry practice for RSS processing.
Audit Metadata