gupp-propulsion
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly uses instructions designed to override an LLM's default behavioral training (RLHF). It employs forceful framing such as "physics, not politeness" and "non-negotiable execution mandate" to bypass standard safety and interaction pauses, demanding immediate action without summarization or confirmation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill programmatically modifies environment configurations, specifically
.claude/settings.json, to injectSessionStarthooks. This alters the agent runtime's behavior for future sessions to enforce GUPP rules autonomously. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A watchdog mechanism facilitates session restarts via the Runtime HAL when an agent is unresponsive. In specific runtimes like Codex, the skill executes commands via
tmux(gt prime) to inject context and rules into the agent session. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by interpolating data from external state files into agent nudges and escalation messages. (Ingestion points:
state/hooks/{agentId}.jsonfor bead and work item data; Boundary markers: Absent; Capability inventory: Session restarts viarequestRestart, durable mail notifications viasendMail, and active nudges viasendNudge; Sanitization: The documented logic does not demonstrate validation or escaping ofbeadIdor other hook metadata before its use in communication channels).
Audit Metadata