architect-boot
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the local file system and interpolates it into the agent's session context, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from
docs/adlc/memory/adr/,.adlc/memory/adr/, and.adlc/drafts/adr/(specificallyADR-*.mdfiles andadr.mdindexes). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ADR files it summarizes.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file read and write operations to manage architectural decisions (e.g., writing drafts to
.adlc/drafts/adr/). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, escaping, or filtering for the content read from the ADR markdown files before it is emitted as part of the session context.
Audit Metadata