evals-clarify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied parameters through
$ARGUMENTSand reads draft evaluation patterns from the local filesystem. These inputs are used to cluster themes and generate adversarial examples which are then passed to the/evals-implementskill for automated code generation of graders. The absence of explicit input sanitization or boundary markers when handling these external data sources creates a surface for indirect prompt injection that could affect the integrity of the resulting evaluation datasets. - Ingestion points: User input captured via
$ARGUMENTSinSKILL.md; draft evaluation criteria patterns read from.adlc/memory/evals/EVAL-*.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing the external criteria or user arguments.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs local file operations (reads and writes) within the project directory and triggers external skill execution (
/evals-implement). - Sanitization: No evidence of escaping or validation is present for the criteria being processed or the arguments being passed.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The bash setup script (
scripts/bash/setup-evals-clarify.sh) utilizes a Python heredoc to format environment variables into a JSON object. This is a standard utility pattern for ensuring consistent data output across different shell environments and does not incorporate untrusted external input into the execution string.
Audit Metadata