evals-clarify

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied parameters through $ARGUMENTS and reads draft evaluation patterns from the local filesystem. These inputs are used to cluster themes and generate adversarial examples which are then passed to the /evals-implement skill for automated code generation of graders. The absence of explicit input sanitization or boundary markers when handling these external data sources creates a surface for indirect prompt injection that could affect the integrity of the resulting evaluation datasets.
  • Ingestion points: User input captured via $ARGUMENTS in SKILL.md; draft evaluation criteria patterns read from .adlc/memory/evals/EVAL-*.md.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing the external criteria or user arguments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs local file operations (reads and writes) within the project directory and triggers external skill execution (/evals-implement).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of escaping or validation is present for the criteria being processed or the arguments being passed.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The bash setup script (scripts/bash/setup-evals-clarify.sh) utilizes a Python heredoc to format environment variables into a JSON object. This is a standard utility pattern for ensuring consistent data output across different shell environments and does not incorporate untrusted external input into the execution string.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 17, 2026, 03:11 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — evals-clarify