factory-architect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow that processes data from potentially untrusted sources, including the project's own architecture and external communication channels.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md, the orchestrator is described as reading from.adlc/drafts/adr/,.adlc/memory/adr/, and project-level architecture. It also explicitly reads consistency findings from a PR/MR/issue comment bus during its correction loop. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are defined to isolate untrusted data (like code-extracted ADRs or PR comments) from the agent's instructional context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute a series of related architectural tools (
architect-specify,architect-clarify,architect-implement,architect-analyze) and performs file system writes toAD.mdand the.adlc/directory as specified inSKILL.mdandworkflow.yml. - Sanitization: The workflow logic in
workflow.ymlperforms direct string matching on command output (steps.analyze.output.stdout | contains(...)) without documented sanitization or validation of the processed content.
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