team-learn
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
evalto process variables returned by theresolve_team_learn_pathsfunction. This function parses theteam_ai_directivespath from a local configuration file (.adlc/init-options.json). If this file contains malicious shell metacharacters, it can lead to arbitrary command execution when the skill is initialized. - Evidence in
scripts/team-learn.sh:eval "$(resolve_team_learn_paths)" - Evidence in
scripts/helpers.sh:TEAM_AI_DIRECTIVES=$(grep '"team_ai_directives"' "${PROJECT_ROOT}/.adlc/init-options.json" | sed 's/.*"team_ai_directives"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/' | head -1) - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
evalto dynamically define shell environment variables and employsawkto evaluate mathematical logic passed as strings. - Evidence in
scripts/score-confidence.sh: Thecalcfunction executes input strings viaawk'sBEGINblock:awk "BEGIN { printf \"%.2f\", $1 }". - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and summarizes the current session history and git logs to extract 'Context Directive Records' (CDRs).
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to review the current session and git history (git diff,git log) to identify reusable patterns. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or directives to ignore instructions embedded within the session data being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the filesystem and perform
git commitandgit pushoperations on a remote repository. - Sanitization: The skill includes
scripts/scrub-session.shwhich usessedto redact secrets (API keys, tokens) from summaries before they are recorded, andsignal_gateinscripts/helpers.shfilters out low-value content.
Audit Metadata