routeros-centrs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes output from external MikroTik routers, which could potentially contain malicious instructions if a device is compromised or its responses are manipulated.
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
centrs retrieve,centrs execute, andcentrs apipull data from remote devices into the agent context. - Boundary markers: Although data is returned in a structured JSON envelope (containing data, warnings, tips, and meta fields), the skill lacks explicit instructions to the agent to treat this data as untrusted or to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides access to local credential files, the ability to execute shell commands, and the capability to transfer files to and from remote devices.
- Sanitization: The tool features an
explaincommand for offline syntax analysis and utilizes the device's own:parseand/console/inspectmachinery to validate commands before execution. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive information required for router management. It reads the local WinBox address book file at
~/.config/tikoci/winbox.cdbto resolve router addresses and credentials. It also utilizes environment variables likeCENTRS_USERNAMEandCENTRS_PASSWORD. The documentation warns that command output (e.g., from/export) may contain unredacted secrets like private keys and API tokens. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages downloading and running the
@tikoci/centrspackage usingbunxfrom the npm registry, which executes code from a remote source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality relies on executing the
centrsCLI tool to perform network operations, file transfers, and device configuration, which involves spawning subprocesses to interact with network infrastructure.
Audit Metadata