routeros-tikoci-quickchr-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The quickchr exec command provides a raw interface to the RouterOS REST API without input validation. This represents a surface for indirect prompt injection if an agent processes untrusted data and pipes it into this command. * Ingestion points: CLI arguments in SKILL.md and machine names. * Boundary markers: None present for raw execution. * Capability inventory: VM lifecycle management, command execution on Guest OS via REST/QGA, and network configuration. * Sanitization: Absent in the raw exec command; the skill documentation mitigates this by recommending the @tikoci/centrs tool for validated execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads MikroTik CHR virtual machine images and installs the @tikoci/quickchr and @tikoci/centrs packages from the public NPM registry. These resources originate from the author's own repositories or well-known networking infrastructure.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing system-level commands such as bun, qemu-img, and qemu-system to perform its primary function of booting and managing virtual routers. This behavior is expected given the skill's description as a shell-first tool for RouterOS interrogation.
Audit Metadata