using-tilebox-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to install the CLI by downloading a script from
cli.tilebox.comand piping it directly to a shell (curl | sh). This is a common but sensitive pattern for software installation. The domain is owned by the skill's vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
tileboxcommand-line tool andjqfor data processing. This includes thetilebox parallelcommand, which is designed to execute other shell commands as arguments. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages authentication using the
TILEBOX_API_KEYenvironment variable. It includes explicit instructions to avoid printing or logging these credentials, which aligns with security best practices for credential management. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and incorporates it into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
tilebox docs search, which retrieves excerpts fromdocs.tilebox.com, andtilebox agent-context, which retrieves command metadata and schemas. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in the documentation search results or schemas.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
tileboxCLI and perform parallel task execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved documentation content is mentioned before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.tilebox.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata