doubt-driven-development
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform shell operations to verify and execute external CLI tools (e.g., Gemini and Codex) for cross-model reviews.
- Evidence: Commands such as
which gemini,gemini --version, and piped execution strings are detailed in the "Cross-model escalation" section ofSKILL.md. - Guardrails: The skill mandates path validation, binary testing, and explicit user authorization for every invocation to prevent unauthorized or accidental command execution.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data (code artifacts and contracts), which presents a risk of indirect prompt injection targeting either the reviewer model or the underlying execution shell.
- Ingestion points: The
ARTIFACTandCONTRACTinputs described in theStep 3: DOUBTsection ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly recommend passing content via stdin or temporary files to ensure that shell metacharacters in the artifact remain inert.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via the
geminiandcodexcommand-line interfaces. - Sanitization: The skill advocates for the use of read-only sandboxes to prevent the external CLI from modifying the local workspace if it encounters malicious instructions within an artifact.
Audit Metadata