download

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries, specifically yt-dlp and ffprobe, to download and inspect media files. These calls use list-based arguments to prevent command injection vulnerabilities, avoiding the use of a shell for execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from external URLs provided by the user. It relies on the yt-dlp binary to handle the connection to hundreds of supported media hosting platforms.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Media files are downloaded to a designated directory within the user's workspace (.mediaskills/downloads) or a path defined by the MEDIASKILLS_DATA_DIR environment variable. This is a standard practice for media processing agents.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection via remote media metadata.
  • Ingestion points: Remote media titles and IDs are fetched from external URLs via yt-dlp in scripts/url.py.
  • Boundary markers: The yt-dlp template limits the title length to 200 bytes, but no explicit sanitization for LLM instructions is present.
  • Capability inventory: The skill and its siblings have capabilities for shell command execution (subprocess.run in scripts/url.py and scripts/_mediaskills_common.py) and file system access.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of metadata sanitization before the output is returned to the agent context, meaning an adversarial title could influence downstream agent behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 20, 2026, 01:21 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — download