download
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries, specifically
yt-dlpandffprobe, to download and inspect media files. These calls use list-based arguments to prevent command injection vulnerabilities, avoiding the use of a shell for execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from external URLs provided by the user. It relies on the
yt-dlpbinary to handle the connection to hundreds of supported media hosting platforms. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Media files are downloaded to a designated directory within the user's workspace (
.mediaskills/downloads) or a path defined by theMEDIASKILLS_DATA_DIRenvironment variable. This is a standard practice for media processing agents. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection via remote media metadata.
- Ingestion points: Remote media titles and IDs are fetched from external URLs via
yt-dlpinscripts/url.py. - Boundary markers: The
yt-dlptemplate limits the title length to 200 bytes, but no explicit sanitization for LLM instructions is present. - Capability inventory: The skill and its siblings have capabilities for shell command execution (
subprocess.runinscripts/url.pyandscripts/_mediaskills_common.py) and file system access. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of metadata sanitization before the output is returned to the agent context, meaning an adversarial title could influence downstream agent behavior.
Audit Metadata