forced-narrative-exact

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external media binaries to process video files using the subprocess module. Detailed analysis confirms these calls are used legitimately for the skill's primary purpose. \n
  • subprocess.run and subprocess.check_output are utilized in scripts/_common.py and scripts/_mediaskills_common.py to invoke ffprobe and ffmpeg for media inspection. \n
  • scripts/scan_caption_band.py uses subprocess.run to call ffmpeg for frame extraction. \n
  • scripts/self_test.py and tests/test_forced_narrative_exact.py invoke utility scripts via uv run to verify the build and validation processes. \n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from video files and OCR output, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection. \n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via OCR text extracted from video frames in scripts/scan_caption_band.py and scripts/refine_boundaries.py. \n
  • Boundary markers: The references/report-contract.md establishes a strict transcription contract, instructing the agent to treat extracted text as literal dialogue and defining clear inclusion/exclusion rules, which acts as a logical boundary. \n
  • Capability inventory: The skill scripts have the ability to execute shell commands via subprocess for media processing and directory management. \n
  • Sanitization: Extracted OCR text is passed through the clean_ocr function in scripts/scan_caption_band.py to remove non-printable characters and normalize whitespace before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 15, 2026, 03:50 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — forced-narrative-exact