forced-narrative-exact
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external media binaries to process video files using the
subprocessmodule. Detailed analysis confirms these calls are used legitimately for the skill's primary purpose. \n subprocess.runandsubprocess.check_outputare utilized inscripts/_common.pyandscripts/_mediaskills_common.pyto invokeffprobeandffmpegfor media inspection. \nscripts/scan_caption_band.pyusessubprocess.runto callffmpegfor frame extraction. \nscripts/self_test.pyandtests/test_forced_narrative_exact.pyinvoke utility scripts viauv runto verify the build and validation processes. \n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from video files and OCR output, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection. \n- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via OCR text extracted from video frames in
scripts/scan_caption_band.pyandscripts/refine_boundaries.py. \n - Boundary markers: The
references/report-contract.mdestablishes a strict transcription contract, instructing the agent to treat extracted text as literal dialogue and defining clear inclusion/exclusion rules, which acts as a logical boundary. \n - Capability inventory: The skill scripts have the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocessfor media processing and directory management. \n - Sanitization: Extracted OCR text is passed through the
clean_ocrfunction inscripts/scan_caption_band.pyto remove non-printable characters and normalize whitespace before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata