vision-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands to process media files. While expected for a media skill, these represent a significant capability surface.
- Evidence:
scripts/_mediaskills_common.pycontains arunwrapper that executes commands usingsubprocess.run. This is used throughout the skill to callffmpegandffprobefor frame extraction and media probing. - Evidence:
scripts/compile_report.pyexecutestesseractfor OCR analysis of extracted frames. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted media content and extracts text via OCR or agent vision, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Media files provided via the
--inputargument are processed into frames inscripts/extract_interval_frames.pyandscripts/compile_report.py. Agent-generated analysis is ingested inscripts/merge_analysis.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when presenting extracted text or frame descriptions to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (writing to
.mediaskills/generated/) and command execution (FFmpeg/Tesseract). - Sanitization:
scripts/_analysis_lib.pyincludes acoerce_frame_analysisfunction that cleans up types and lengths, but does not sanitize the actual text content for malicious instructions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The test suite includes a mechanism to synchronize shared libraries from a repository root.
- Evidence:
tests/test_vision_analysis.pycontains async_commonfixture that executessync_shared_libs.pyfrom the repository root using the current Python interpreter.
Audit Metadata