agent-delegation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to identify the current execution environment by inspecting environment variables (
env | grep). - Evidence:
env | grep -E '^(CLAUDECODE|CODEX_THREAD_ID|ANTIGRAVITY_AGENT|OPENCODE)='inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various CLI-based agent tools (
opencode,agy,codex,claude) with interpolated prompts and arguments. - Evidence: Tables and command templates in
SKILL.mdsuch asopencode run --agent <build|plan> ...andagy --model <model> .... - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface where malicious instructions could be introduced via untrusted data sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads output from sub-agents, as well as system state via
git status --shortandgit diff(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: It attempts to use specific instruction markers like "你是被派工的執行者" (You are the dispatched executor) to define boundaries and roles, though these are not cryptographically secure.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute arbitrary commands through the integrated CLI tools across all task types (SKILL.md, references/cli-cheatsheet.md).
- Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly specify sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the data received from sub-agents before it is processed by the main agent.
Audit Metadata