dev-task-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external task trackers (Jira, Linear, GitHub, etc.) to drive development actions.
- Ingestion points: Task descriptions, attachments, and design references (Figma, screenshots) are read from trackers and files (SKILL.md, Phase 2.1).
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious commands embedded in task descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write files, execute shell commands (git, npm, tsc), perform browser automation via
javascript_tool, and manage repository states (Phase 2.4-2.10). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content fetched from the trackers is mentioned.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local command execution to perform its primary function. It utilizes
gitfor version control,gh/glabfor platform integration, andpnpm/npm/npxfor build and test verification (Phase 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 2.8). - [SAFE]: Several security best practices are explicitly enforced within the instructions:
- It prohibits the modification of
.envfiles or any files outside the project root. - It mandates staging specific files for commits rather than using
git add ., which reduces the risk of accidental secret exposure. - It uses
--force-with-leasefor git push operations to prevent unintentional branch overwrites. - It requires upfront user confirmation for all critical workflow parameters before starting the automated loop.
Audit Metadata