open-slide-studio
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run
npx @open-slide/cli init, which downloads and executes a CLI tool from the npm registry. This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary code defined in the external package on the host machine.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires the execution of multiple shell commands includingpnpm install,pnpm dev,pnpm build, andpnpm sync:skillsto manage the local development and build environment.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and updates dependencies from the npm registry (@open-slide/cli,@open-slide/core) and references an external GitHub repository for the framework source code.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides procedures for deploying the compiled static site (dist/folder) to external hosting providers such as Vercel, Netlify, Cloudflare Pages, and Zeabur.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input and files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The skill ingests user-provided
topicandstyle_directioninputs, and reads content fromDESIGN.mdand workspace theme files. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities (
npx,pnpm) and can trigger network operations via deployment scripts. - Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization, filtering, or validation steps for the external content it processes.
Audit Metadata