open-slide-studio
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow instructs the agent to run
npx @open-slide/cli init, which downloads and executes arbitrary code from an external package registry without version pinning or source verification. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
pnpm installandpnpm up @open-slide/coreto fetch dependencies. These packages are associated with an unverified repository (github.com/1weiho/open-slide) rather than a trusted organization or well-known service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands (
npx,pnpm dev,pnpm build,pnpm preview) in the local environment to initialize and manage the workspace. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data that could influence its behavior or the code it generates.
- Ingestion points:
topicinput,DESIGN.mdfile, and user comments on UI elements. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing workflow.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands and modify local files.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of external content before it is processed or used in code generation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata