open-slide-studio

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow instructs the agent to run npx @open-slide/cli init, which downloads and executes arbitrary code from an external package registry without version pinning or source verification.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses pnpm install and pnpm up @open-slide/core to fetch dependencies. These packages are associated with an unverified repository (github.com/1weiho/open-slide) rather than a trusted organization or well-known service.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands (npx, pnpm dev, pnpm build, pnpm preview) in the local environment to initialize and manage the workspace.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data that could influence its behavior or the code it generates.
  • Ingestion points: topic input, DESIGN.md file, and user comments on UI elements.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing workflow.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands and modify local files.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of external content before it is processed or used in code generation.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 13, 2026, 06:17 AM