postgrest-baas-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to install and execute the
@insforge/mcppackage directly from NPM usingnpx -y @insforge/mcp@latest. Executing unpinned remote code at runtime poses a risk of supply chain attacks or version instability. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides multiple Bash command templates for the agent to execute, including configuring MCP servers (
claude mcp add), testing API connectivity viacurl, and running complex shell scripts to generate and sign JWTs usingopenssl. These operations involve high-privilege access to the user's environment. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages highly sensitive database credentials, such as
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEYand InsForge admin API keys, which bypass Row Level Security (RLS). While it provides best-practice guidance for secret management (using.env.exampleand.gitignore), the instructions involve the agent directly handling and verifying these secrets in the shell. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external platform instructions and user-provided configuration without explicit boundary markers or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/insforge.mdguide the agent to interpret data from external BaaS platforms and environment variables. - Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or warnings are used to distinguish instructions from external data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted
Bash,Write,Read, andEdittools, allowing for command execution and file modification based on ingested data. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or escaping is present for variables interpolated into shell commands or SQL scripts.
Audit Metadata