interrogate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes code changes and diffs provided by the user or read from the filesystem and interpolates them directly into prompts for delegated reviewer tasks via the template in
references/reviewer-prompt.md. Maliciously crafted comments or code within these files could contain instructions designed to deceive the reviewer agents or bypass their safety guidelines. - Ingestion points: Code diffs and file contents are gathered in
SKILL.mdStep 1. - Boundary markers: The
references/reviewer-prompt.mdtemplate lacks boundary markers or explicit instructions for reviewers to ignore embedded prompts within the{DIFF_OR_FILES}block. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
delegate_taskto spawn multiple sub-agents andgit diffto read files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested code content before it is interpolated into the prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute shell commands, specifically
git diff, to gather code context. There is a potential risk if the branch names or file paths are derived from unvalidated user input. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to rungit diff main...HEADor determine an "appropriate base branch" based on the user's message, and to executekickoff-setupif certain configurations are missing.
Audit Metadata