orchestrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator fetches sub-issue metadata (numbers and titles) from GitHub and interpolates them into prompt templates for child agents, creating an attack surface for malicious issue titles.
- Ingestion points: Sub-issue data is fetched in
SKILL.md(Step 1) usinggh api graphqland stored for use in prompts. - Boundary markers: The prompt skeleton in
package-prompt.mdlacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat the$TITLEvariable as untrusted data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including
gitbranch management,ghPR merging, and execution of local shell scripts and package managers. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or character escaping for the fetched issue titles was found.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution and calls local scripts to manage the development lifecycle.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdexecutesnode .agents/skills/verify/scripts/default-branch.mjsto resolve branching logic andghcommands for repository interaction. - Evidence:
package-prompt.mdinstructs agents to executescripts/worktree-up.shand variousgitandnpmcommands. - Evidence:
ops.mdreferences the use ofvercel inspectandnpm run verifyfor deployment diagnostics.
Audit Metadata