skills/timschoch/skilly/orchestrate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

orchestrate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator fetches sub-issue metadata (numbers and titles) from GitHub and interpolates them into prompt templates for child agents, creating an attack surface for malicious issue titles.
  • Ingestion points: Sub-issue data is fetched in SKILL.md (Step 1) using gh api graphql and stored for use in prompts.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt skeleton in package-prompt.md lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat the $TITLE variable as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including git branch management, gh PR merging, and execution of local shell scripts and package managers.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or character escaping for the fetched issue titles was found.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution and calls local scripts to manage the development lifecycle.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md executes node .agents/skills/verify/scripts/default-branch.mjs to resolve branching logic and gh commands for repository interaction.
  • Evidence: package-prompt.md instructs agents to execute scripts/worktree-up.sh and various git and npm commands.
  • Evidence: ops.md references the use of vercel inspect and npm run verify for deployment diagnostics.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 08:32 AM