agy-harness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and install the Antigravity CLI tool directly from Google's official package repository using the Windows Package Manager (winget).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions involve executing the
wingetinstaller, theagy.exebinary, and various system utilities such aswhere.exeto verify the installation and drive CLI tasks. - [PERSISTENCE]: The documentation describes the
agy installcommand, which is used to append the tool's binary path and shell aliases to the user's shell profile, ensuring the environment remains configured across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a multi-step execution chain by allowing a host agent to pass arbitrary natural language prompts to the Gemini CLI (
agy --print). This creates a vulnerability surface if the sub-agent is configured with the recommended high-privilege settings. - Ingestion points: The prompt argument passed to
agy --printinSKILL.mdserves as the entry point for untrusted data into the sub-agent's context. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instruction-guarding markers provided to separate the system instructions from the content of the prompt passed to the CLI.
- Capability inventory: The skill explicitly recommends configuring the tool's settings (
settings.json) withread_file(*)andcommand(*)permissions, which allows the sub-agent to read local files and execute arbitrary shell commands. - Sanitization: The harness does not implement any input sanitization or validation of the sub-agent's output before it is processed by the host environment.
Audit Metadata