buzz-hermes-gateway
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill configures a messaging gateway that ingests and processes data from an external platform, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The gateway reads messages and commands from an external Buzz relay via the configured
relay_url(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill advocates for security controls including
require_mention: trueto limit processing to targeted messages andallow_all_users: falsecombined with anallowed_userslist to restrict the agent's interaction to authorized identities (SKILL.md). - Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to execute shell commands via the
buzzCLI, manage systemd user units, and modify local configuration and environment files (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify explicit sanitization or escaping of message content, relying instead on the underlying implementation of the Hermes gateway and Buzz plugin.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for building and installing the Buzz command-line interface from source.
- Evidence: Instructions include
cargo build --release --locked -p buzz-cliandinstall -m 755 target/release/buzz /usr/local/bin/buzzto compile and deploy the binary to a system path (SKILL.md). - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill utilizes standard service management for maintaining the agent process.
- Evidence: Instructions describe creating a systemd user unit drop-in at
~/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service.d/buzz-env.confto ensure the gateway process loads environment variables and persists across sessions (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata