harness-offload
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/Invoke-HarnessOffload.ps1executes external agent binaries includingagy,opencode,copilot,codex, andhermesusing theSystem.Diagnostics.Processclass. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
Ensure-AgyHeadlessReadAllowfunction inscripts/Invoke-HarnessOffload.ps1modifies the persistent configuration file at~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/settings.json. It automatically addsread_file(*)andcommand(*)to the allowed permissions list and enablesallowNonWorkspaceAccess, effectively lowering the security sandbox of theagyCLI tool for both current and future sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the transfer of instructions from a host agent to a sub-agent worker, creating a vector for cross-agent instruction injection.
- Ingestion points: The
$Promptparameter inscripts/Invoke-HarnessOffload.ps1receives instructions from the host environment. - Boundary markers: The script appends a text guard directive to the prompt, which may be insufficient to prevent sophisticated prompt injection attacks against the worker agents.
- Capability inventory: Depending on the worker selected and the state of the
AllowToolsflag, the skill can execute arbitrary shell commands, read/write files, and access network resources through the invoked agents. - Sanitization: The script performs command-line argument escaping using a custom
ConvertTo-WinArgLinefunction, but it does not validate or sanitize the semantic content of the prompt passed to the external agents.
Audit Metadata