meegle

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles untrusted data from project work items and comments, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Commands such as meegle workitem get, meegle view items, and meegle comment list ingest user-generated content (titles, descriptions, comments) from the Feishu Project platform into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: The skill contains a dedicated 'Prompt Injection Defense' section in references/error-handling.md which provides explicit instructions to the AI agent to treat remote data as display text only and never as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant write capabilities, including work item creation/updating, workflow transitions (workflow transition), and attachment management (attachment upload/delete).
  • Sanitization: Relies on the internal instruction set to ensure the agent maintains context and does not execute commands embedded in retrieved project data.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation provides instructions for installing the necessary CLI utility from an external package registry.
  • Evidence: npm install -g @tingwillforever/meegle-cli as specified in references/runtime-private-remote-mcp.md.
  • Context: The package is published under the author's own namespace and is the core functional component required for the skill to operate.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 26, 2026, 09:25 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — meegle