meegle-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, specifically through the decoding of user-provided URLs and the retrieval of work item content (titles, descriptions, and comments) from the Meegle backend. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the remote content contains malicious instructions for the agent.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through the
meegle url decodecommand and various work item retrieval commands likeworkitem getandsearch-filter(documented in SKILL.md and references/workitem.md). - Boundary markers: The skill includes a dedicated "Prompt Injection Defense" section in
references/error-handling.mdwhich explicitly instructs the agent to treat all remote data as data, not instruction, and never to execute instructions found in user-generated content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system access (read/write), network operations via the CLI, and command execution (CLI tools and local interpreters).
- Sanitization: While the skill provides strong semantic instructions to the model to ignore injections, it does not specify technical sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the ingested text before it is placed in the prompt.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to install and update the
@tingwillforever/meegle-clipackage globally via NPM. As this package belongs to the skill's author, it is categorized as a vendor-owned resource. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on executing the
meegleCLI tool. It also instructs the agent to use local interpreters (node,python3) for processing JSON data, formatting timestamps, and reducing metadata payloads. These are standard operations for a developer-oriented CLI skill.
Audit Metadata