skills/tingyulu/myr2d2/daily-debrief/Gen Agent Trust Hub

daily-debrief

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local shell commands for file management (mv), validation (wc, grep), and log harvesting (scripts/harvest.py). It also executes a user-defined command hook (JOURNAL_POST_CMD) retrieved from a local configuration file (~/.claude/journal/config.env). User-supplied date arguments are passed to shell commands, which may present a command injection surface if the agent does not properly sanitize the input.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill processes session transcripts and report data, with instructions to optionally send this data to external notification services (e.g., Slack, Telegram, Notion) via a user-configured command hook. This functionality is part of the skill's primary purpose for automated reporting.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes session transcripts (jsonl files) which are untrusted data sources. Malicious instructions embedded in a user's previous chat sessions could influence the report generation or subsequent automated actions.
  • Ingestion points: Session logs in journal/raw/ and previously generated report files.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating transcript data into the report template.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, write to the local file system, and access local configuration files containing potential environment variables or hooks.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external transcript content is mentioned.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 9, 2026, 01:03 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — daily-debrief