daily-debrief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local shell commands for file management (
mv), validation (wc,grep), and log harvesting (scripts/harvest.py). It also executes a user-defined command hook (JOURNAL_POST_CMD) retrieved from a local configuration file (~/.claude/journal/config.env). User-supplied date arguments are passed to shell commands, which may present a command injection surface if the agent does not properly sanitize the input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill processes session transcripts and report data, with instructions to optionally send this data to external notification services (e.g., Slack, Telegram, Notion) via a user-configured command hook. This functionality is part of the skill's primary purpose for automated reporting.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes session transcripts (
jsonlfiles) which are untrusted data sources. Malicious instructions embedded in a user's previous chat sessions could influence the report generation or subsequent automated actions. - Ingestion points: Session logs in
journal/raw/and previously generated report files. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating transcript data into the report template.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, write to the local file system, and access local configuration files containing potential environment variables or hooks.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external transcript content is mentioned.
Audit Metadata