acp-agent-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs several global npm installations. While packages from Anthropic (
@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-acp) and OpenAI (@openai/codex) originate from trusted organizations, the skill also installs 'opencode' from a non-verified source. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
npx @skills-hub-ai/cli installto download and execute additional software components. The '@skills-hub-ai' organization is not a verified or well-known service, posing a risk of executing untrusted code in the user's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to detect editor versions, list extensions, and register agents via CLI tools like
devin agent add. This involves high-level access to the development environment configuration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains logic to read preferred skill names from local project files (
.skills-hub.jsonorCLAUDE.md) and pass them directly to an installation command (npx @skills-hub-ai/cli install). This creates a vulnerability where malicious instructions or package names in these project files could lead to unauthorized software installation. - Ingestion points: Reads content from
.skills-hub.jsonandCLAUDE.mdin the project root. - Boundary markers: None. Content from these files is used directly as arguments.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
npm,npx, and editor CLIs; file system writes to~/.devin/agents.json,.zed/agents.json, etc. - Sanitization: None; the skill uses the names found in the files directly to fetch and install packages.
Audit Metadata