actuarial-modeling
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates a direct injection vector by using the
$ARGUMENTSplaceholder to pass user-supplied input into its execution logic without validation or filtering. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses behavioral overrides such as "Do NOT ask the user questions. Analyze and act," which promotes high agent autonomy and may bypass standard user-confirmation checkpoints, increasing the risk of unintended actions.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its broad file-ingestion surface.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to scan and ingest content from various untrusted sources, including
*.sasconfigurations,*.rscripts,*.xlsxworkbooks, and database schemas (Phase 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack the use of delimiters or explicit "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the content read from the project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform file writes to the project directory (
docs/actuarial-modeling-analysis.md) and modify telemetry logs in a hidden directory outside the project root (~/.claude/projects/). - Sanitization: There is no requirement or logic provided for the agent to sanitize, escape, or validate the content extracted from external files before it is processed by the model.
Audit Metadata