changelog

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include 'You are in AUTONOMOUS MODE. Do NOT ask questions,' which explicitly directs the agent to bypass standard interactive safety loops and user confirmation steps.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands including 'git tag', 'git log', and 'git remote get-url' to extract repository data. While these are required for the skill's purpose, they interact with external state and user-supplied commit history.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The 'Self-Evolution Telemetry' phase attempts to access and write to the '~/.claude/projects/' directory. Accessing the user's home directory to store execution metadata is a form of background tracking that occurs outside the primary scope of generating a changelog.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from git commit messages and PR descriptions which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the generation phase.
  • Ingestion points: Git commit history retrieved via 'git log' and existing 'CHANGELOG.md' files.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following directives embedded within commit messages.
  • Capability inventory: File system read/write, shell command execution, and telemetry logging to the home directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill parses and re-formats commit messages directly into the output document without filtering or escaping content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 10:58 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — changelog