changelog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include 'You are in AUTONOMOUS MODE. Do NOT ask questions,' which explicitly directs the agent to bypass standard interactive safety loops and user confirmation steps.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands including 'git tag', 'git log', and 'git remote get-url' to extract repository data. While these are required for the skill's purpose, they interact with external state and user-supplied commit history.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The 'Self-Evolution Telemetry' phase attempts to access and write to the '~/.claude/projects/' directory. Accessing the user's home directory to store execution metadata is a form of background tracking that occurs outside the primary scope of generating a changelog.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from git commit messages and PR descriptions which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the generation phase.
- Ingestion points: Git commit history retrieved via 'git log' and existing 'CHANGELOG.md' files.
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following directives embedded within commit messages.
- Capability inventory: File system read/write, shell command execution, and telemetry logging to the home directory.
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill parses and re-formats commit messages directly into the output document without filtering or escaping content.
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