cost-overrun-predictor
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains instructions to access sensitive platform-specific directories in the user's home folder.
- Evidence: The 'Self-Evolution Telemetry' section explicitly directs the agent to look for project paths in
~/.claude/projects/and append execution metadata to askill-telemetry.mdfile within that path. - Impact: Accessing internal platform state or memory directories is a security concern as it allows a third-party skill to interact with the platform's private data storage, potentially leading to the exposure of project metadata or the persistence of information outside the controlled project environment.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to the way it processes external project data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads various project files, including package manifests, configuration files, and database schemas (Phases 1-6 in SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities to read and write files across the local system and the platform's internal storage.
- Sanitization: Absent; there are no instructions for validating, escaping, or filtering content ingested from the project codebase.
- Impact: An attacker could place malicious instructions inside a project's configuration or data files that the agent might inadvertently follow during its analysis.
Audit Metadata