dns
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly command the agent to operate in an autonomous mode and suppress all user confirmation prompts ("You are in AUTONOMOUS MODE", "Do NOT ask questions", "Do NOT pause for confirmation"). This increases the risk of the agent following malicious instructions embedded in processed data without human intervention.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute shell commands for validating generated infrastructure code, including
terraform validate,docker build --check, andkubectl dry-run. It also suggests the creation of a persistent cron job forcertbotcertificate renewal and writes execution metadata to a telemetry file in~/.claude/projects/.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Data is ingested from CLI arguments, environment variables, and a wide variety of project configuration files (e.g.,
package.json,vercel.json,netlify.toml,next.config.js).\n - Boundary markers: There are no specified delimiters or instructions to treat the content of these files as untrusted when used in prompt generation.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can generate and write Infrastructure as Code, run validation subprocesses, and modify local telemetry files in the user's home directory.\n
- Sanitization: The skill does not describe any methods for sanitizing or validating input from these external configuration files before they influence the agent's output or actions.
Audit Metadata