fleet-maintenance
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to interact with the
~/.claude/projects/directory, which is a sensitive path containing internal agent configuration, history, and project state. The 'Self-Evolution Telemetry' feature writes execution metadata to this hidden path, enabling the tracking of user activity across sessions and the potential manipulation of the agent's long-term behavior through the mentioned evolution pipeline. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from vehicle records, maintenance logs, and telematics systems without implementing boundary markers or sanitization logic. * Ingestion points: Found in Step 1.1 (Vehicle records), Step 1.2 (Maintenance architecture), and Step 6.1 (Telematics integration). * Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the processed fleet data. * Capability inventory: The agent has extensive file system access, including the ability to read the entire codebase and write to both the project's documentation folder and the agent's internal configuration paths. * Sanitization: No input validation, filtering, or escaping is specified for the data ingested from external sources.
Audit Metadata