fraud-detection
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Access to Sensitive Paths. The skill instructions direct the agent to read from
~/.claude/projects/, a hidden directory in the user's home folder. Hidden directories often contain sensitive configuration, session tokens, or platform-specific metadata. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistence Mechanism. The
SELF-EVOLUTION TELEMETRYsection instructs the agent to append execution metadata to~/.claude/projects/skill-telemetry.md. This allows the skill to maintain state and track performance across different sessions, which constitutes a local persistence mechanism. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from the local repository, including
requirements.txt,package.json,docker-compose.yml, and the actual codebase. - Ingestion points: Multiple configuration files and the entire codebase are read during Phase 0 and subsequent analysis phases.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions are provided to the agent when processing these external files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to read files from the system and write telemetry data to the home directory.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the content from the analyzed files is performed before it is incorporated into the agent's context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata