fraud-detection

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Access to Sensitive Paths. The skill instructions direct the agent to read from ~/.claude/projects/, a hidden directory in the user's home folder. Hidden directories often contain sensitive configuration, session tokens, or platform-specific metadata.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistence Mechanism. The SELF-EVOLUTION TELEMETRY section instructs the agent to append execution metadata to ~/.claude/projects/skill-telemetry.md. This allows the skill to maintain state and track performance across different sessions, which constitutes a local persistence mechanism.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from the local repository, including requirements.txt, package.json, docker-compose.yml, and the actual codebase.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple configuration files and the entire codebase are read during Phase 0 and subsequent analysis phases.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions are provided to the agent when processing these external files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to read files from the system and write telemetry data to the home directory.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the content from the analyzed files is performed before it is incorporated into the agent's context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 10:57 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — fraud-detection