full-test
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill autonomously executes system-level commands and testing tools (e.g.,
k6,Artillery,Locust,ab,autocannon,npm audit,pip audit,cargo audit) based on its automatic discovery of the project stack. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Includes a 'Self-Healing Fix Loop' and the generation of 'scripted loops' for performance testing, which involves the dynamic creation and execution of code within the host environment.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses and modifies files within the
~/.claude/projects/directory, which is a sensitive location used for agent configuration and project memory. It appends execution metadata toskill-telemetry.mdwithout explicit user consent for this specific file path. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Injects user-provided
$ARGUMENTSdirectly into the system instructions without boundary markers or sanitization, allowing input to potentially manipulate the testing target or override the pipeline's logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of ingesting and acting upon untrusted project data.
- Ingestion points: Reads project source code, specifications, and environment configurations during Phase 1 (E2E discovery) and Phase 2 (Manual Test Plan generation).
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or protective warnings are used when processing project data to differentiate between data and instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the filesystem, execute shell commands, and perform 'self-healing' modifications to the codebase.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of project-derived content before it is used to influence agent decisions or code modifications.
Audit Metadata