grid-optimizer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The 'SELF-EVOLUTION TELEMETRY' section instructs the agent to search for specific project paths within the hidden directory ~/.claude/projects/. While intended for logging, this involves accessing sensitive platform-specific state folders in the user's home directory.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill attempts to maintain a log of its executions by writing to skill-telemetry.md within the ~/.claude/projects/ directory. Automated writing to hidden system/platform directories without explicit user consent is a persistence risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include autonomy-forcing directives such as 'Do NOT ask questions' and 'Investigate the entire codebase systematically', which aim to override the agent's standard conversational and safety-checking behaviors.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of processing untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads the 'entire grid optimization codebase' from the current working directory and accepts user-provided $ARGUMENTS.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple backticks) to separate the analyzed codebase content from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive analysis capabilities and performs file system read operations across various tech stacks. It also includes the ability to write telemetry data to the home directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no requirement or logic provided to sanitize, escape, or filter instructions that might be embedded in the code files being analyzed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 10:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — grid-optimizer