hipaa
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the
$ARGUMENTSvariable directly within instructions that set an 'AUTONOMOUS MODE' and command the agent to 'Do NOT ask questions.' This creates a surface where user-supplied input could potentially override the intended audit process. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a 'Self-Evolution Telemetry' feature that attempts to append execution metadata to
~/.claude/projects/skill-telemetry.md. Accessing and modifying files in the user's home directory (~/) outside of the immediate project workspace is a data access concern. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it is designed to systematically read and process an entire codebase, which is untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The audited codebase (all files in the current working directory) and the
$ARGUMENTSinput. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing the target codebase.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read any file in the repository and append content to a telemetry file in the home directory.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from the codebase before it is processed by the agent's logic.
Audit Metadata