The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data via the $ARGUMENTS parameter and uses it as context for a high-privilege audit pipeline.
Ingestion points: The $ARGUMENTS variable defines the 'TARGET' for all subsequent audit phases in SKILL.md.
Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or 'ignore' directives to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the target codebase or documentation.
Capability inventory: The skill can write files, commit to Git, and execute local build/test commands (Phase 3, 4, 5, and Self-Healing).
Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the input context is performed before it is processed by the agent.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to automatically 'Fix all issues found and commit the fixes' and run build/test suites. This creates a dynamic execution surface (Category 10) where malicious instructions in the audited project could manipulate the agent into generating and executing harmful code under the guise of a 'fix'.
[DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the ~/.claude/projects/ directory to record execution telemetry (Category 2). While this is a standard configuration path for the Claude Code platform, accessing files outside the immediate project root to log metadata is a sensitive operation that should be monitored.

launch-readiness